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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a trust-based message propagation and evaluation frame-
work to support the effective evaluation of information sent by peers and the immediate
control of false information in a VANET. More specifically, our trust-based message prop-
agation collects peers trust opinions about a message sent by a peer (message sender)
during the propagation of the message. We improve on an existing cluster-based data
routing mechanism by employing a secure and efficient identity-based aggregation scheme
for the aggregation and propagation of the senders message and the trust opinions. These
trust opinions weighted by the trustworthiness of the peers modeled using a combination
of role-based and experience-based trust metrics are used by cluster leaders to compute a
ma jority opinion about the senders message, in order to proactively detect false informa-
tion. Malicious messages are dropped and controlled to a local minimum without further
affecting other peers. Our trust-based message evaluation allows each peer to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the message by also taking into account other peers trust opinions about
the message and the peer-to-peer trust of these peers. The result of the evaluation derives
an effective action decision for the peer.
We evaluate our framework in simulations of real life traffic scenarios by employing real
maps with vehicle entities following traffic rules and road limits. Some entities involved in
the simulations are possibly malicious and may send false information to mislead others
or spread spam messages to jam the network. Experimental results demonstrate that our
framework signicantly improves network scalability by reducing the utilization of wireless
bandwidth caused by a large number of malicious messages. Our system is also demon-
strated to be effective in mitigating against malicious messages and protecting peers from
being affected. Thus, our framework is particularly valuable in the deployment of VANETs
by achieving a high level of scalability and effectiveness.
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With the advance and wide deployment of wireless communication technologies, vehicle
manufactures and research academia are heavily engaged in the blueprint of future vehicular
ad-hoc networks. Tremendous efforts have been spent on their design and analysis that
involve a wide range of research objectives, such as radio frequency spectrum design [1],
global position system [2], group communication [3], information dissemination [4], security
[5], and privacy [6]. There also emerge a rich variety of applications, including life-critical
ones such as safety message sharing [7], cooperative collision avoidance [8], and secure
crash reporting [9], as well as infotainment applications such as the traffic view system [10],
content distribution [11], cooperative downloading [12], Wi-Fi-based vehicular Internet [13],
and car-based mobile sensor computing system [14], etc.
1.1 Motivation
There are two types of communications in vehicular networks, i.e. vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) where messages are passed between vehicles and infrastructures (Road Side Units)
and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) where messages are propagated among peers. The latter
V2V communication is challenging and involves much focus on networking routing research
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where we realize that there are two problems within current research, as discussed follow.
First of all, although previous efforts in the field of network routings [15] have been
devoted to generally ensuring a reliable message delivery, there lacks an effective message
evaluation approach which is appreciated because it is useful to quantitatively present the
quality of data so as to differentiate and prioritize data, and provide suggestions among
a set of messages. However, data evaluation may not fully rely on the assumption of a
pervasively available infrastructure such as an online central authority or road side units,
due to concerns of broadness of the real vehicle environment and high deployment and
communication cost.
Second, little concern so far has been focused on malicious data control in the applica-
tion layer. Previous endeavors in [16, 17, 18] focus on the eviction of misbehaving peers
via certification revocation through which malicious peers will be identified and restricted
from further hampering the network. However, two shortcomings are evident in these ap-
proaches. On one hand, the mitigation against maliciousness is entity-oriented rather than
data-oriented. In other words, they assume that the quality of data absolutely depends on
the peer’s honesty, which ignores the variety of data types and might be problematic under
life-critical scenarios, e.g. a misbehaving peer with its revoked certificate is not capable to
send S.O.S. signals upon real car accidents. On the other hand, the methodology taken
towards the malicious data control is reactive. Specifically, it takes a considerable time
for the central authority to distribute an up-to-date revocation list before malicious peers
can be timely identified. A proactive approach is much appreciated in that upon detection
of malicious data it can be immediately controlled to minimize its further negative effect
on other peers. A model on detecting malicious data in vehicular networks is proposed in
[19], which is the one of few research papers that we have found in our context. It features
an assumed model in each vehicle that acquires the global knowledge of the network and
solely evaluates the validity of data. Considering that such a model with global knowledge
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may not be feasible in practice, we propose that evaluation should be done in a distributed
and collaborative fashion.
The question becomes that is it possible to have a particular data dissemination scheme
in vehicular networks that offers a quantitative approach to data evaluation, and at the same
time detects and controls malicious data, proactively and collaboratively? In this thesis, we
attempt to answer this question using a trust-based method.
1.2 Contribution
Our contributions to the networking research in vehicular networks are stated as follows.
• Improved system effectiveness. We propose a trust-based message evaluation model
that collects instant feedback during message propagation, in a distributed and col-
laborative manner. From a set of trust metrics such as trust opinions, experience-
based and role-based trust, we further model the message quality as data trustwor-
thiness which serves as a quantitative approach to data evaluation. Experiments
demonstrate that our system is capable of proactively and effectively coping with the
pervasive existence of malicious messages.
• Improved network scalability. A trust-based relay control model is presented in our
thesis which proactively detects malicious messages during dissemination. Malicious
data is therefore dropped and controlled to a local minimum without further affecting
other peers. As demonstrated in our experiments, network scalability is improved in
that less malicious traffic is involved.
• Efficient and secure data aggregation. We employ an identity-based aggregation
scheme that aggregates trust opinions in an efficient and secure fashion. Trust is
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therefore effectively established through messaging among multiple peers in vehicu-
lar networks where the trust relationship is believed to be difficult to build due to
great dynamics and ephemeral connectivity among peers.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. We demonstrate a trust-based message eval-
uation and propagation model in Chapter 2, and illustrate a secure, efficient and scalable
trust opinion aggregation scheme in Chapter 3. Experimental simulation and analysis are
conducted to evaluate our work in Chapter 4. After that, we survey some related work




Trust-based Message Evaluation and
Propagation
In this chapter, we present a trust-based message evaluation and propagation model in
vehicular networks. We aim to build a data dissemination framework where data trustwor-
thiness and trust for the vehicle entities work together to serve as a criterion of message
evaluation and propagation.
This chapter is organized as follows. A quick overview of our trust-based system is first
illustrated in Section 2.1, where we introduce the data design and system components.
We demonstrate our trust-based message evaluation model in Section 2.2, and trust-based
message propagation model in Section 2.4. The peer-to-peer trust module is presented in
Section 2.3. We further discuss the handling of the presence of authority in Section 2.5,
and finally summarize this chapter in Section 2.6.
2.1 System Overview
The basic idea of our proposed system is to evaluate and disseminate a message based on
its quality. We design our system in a way that messages can be evaluated in a distributed
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and collaborative fashion. At the same time, the dissemination distance of a particular
message is largely dependent on its quality, so that messages of good quality propagate
to the furthest distance while malicious data, such as spams, are controlled to a local
minimum.
We model the message quality using a trust-based approach. In other words, the quality
of a message is mapped to a trustworthiness value, which can be computed from a collection
of distributed feedback from other peers in the network. Specifically, during the message
propagation, the peer who receives the message can instantly provide feedback, namely,
a trust opinion generated from an equipped analysis module. A set of trust opinions are
appended to the message during message propagation. For those who receive the message,
their action module may decide to trust or distrust it by computing its trustworthiness
from an aggregated list of trust opinions. Details are available in Section 2.2.
Apart from the trust modeling on data quality, we further model the behavior of vehicle
entities using a peer-to-peer trust approach proposed by Minhas et al. [20] – each peer’s
behavior is mapped to a trust value which is dependent on the quality of messages and
trust opinions from the peer. We present this peer-to-peer trust module in Section 2.3.
Figure 2.1 gives an example of message propagation under the scenario of a six-laned
highway. Sender S broadcasts a message to its neighborhood. Each neighbor sends back a
trust opinion. These trust opinions are collected and merged into the sender’s message by
a relaying vehicle. Upon the reception of a relayed message, the relayer broadcasts it to its
neighbors, collects their trust opinions if there is any, merges them into the message, and
sends it to the next hop1 in a recursive way. Details of message propagation are discussed
in Section 2.4.
1Hop is a network routing term used for the next gateway (peer) to which packets should be forwarded







 Relaying Vehicles 
Vehicles 
Original Sender S 
Figure 2.1: Message Propagation in Vehicular Networks
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2.1.1 Data Design
In our system, there are three types of data: sender message, trust opinion, and aggregate
message. We show the purpose and design of each in the following:
Sender Message
A sender S prepares the message
M = [event, confidence, time, location] (2.1)
where confidence ∈ [0, 1], time ∈ N , and location ∈ N × N . Sender confidence provides
flexibility in reporting an event – higher confidence indicates the sender itself is more
confident in the reported event. Time is a positive integer and location is a geographical
coordinate, both being available from an equipped GPS device.
Please note that sender ID is not included in M ; instead, it is included in the signed
message M ′ = [M, ID, S], where S is the signature. To ensure a secure data dissemination
environment, we require sender messages be signed. The requirement of signatures applies
to trust opinions as well.
Trust Opinion
Trust opinion is a message that serves as an evaluation of the sender message. Evaluation
is conducted by comparing the reported event with the peer’s current knowledge, which
may come from a number of equipped car sensors, the local database, or even human
interactions. We assume there is an analysis module that provides such an opinion. More
specifically, the analysis module provides a mapping function f : M×K → R×C that maps
the sender message M and local knowledge K to the product of reaction R and confidence
C, where R = {trust,¬trust} denotes whether the evaluator trusts the message, and














Figure 2.2: Trust Opinion
Trust opinion is a combination of reaction and confidence. Valid, reliable, correct mes-
sages should be trusted but cheating, unreliable, or jamming messages should be distrusted.
The derivation of reaction is dependent on multiple factors, and each type of message may
have its unique metric. For example, given that the event of sender message is observa-
tional, such as weather conditions, the neighboring vehicles are capable to give correct
reactions based on their own observations.
Higher confidence values indicate that the evaluator itself is more confident in its eval-
uation. The generation of confidence values should be based on multiple factors as well,
such as past peer interaction history, user preference, time and location difference between
the sender and evaluator. For observational events, it is commonly believed that confidence
decreases as time elapses and distance grows. For example, a peer witnesses a car accident
and broadcasts a message. High confidence values should be placed for those nearby vehi-
cles, but for those further peers who are not sure of the car accident, they may give a low
confidence value, or not even provide a trust opinion.
In practice, upon reception of sender message M ′, an evaluator Vi verifies M
′, extracts
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M , analyzes M , and generates the trust opinion
Oi = [reaction, confidence] (2.2)
. Vi signs M and Oi into
O′i = [M,Oi, IDi, Si] (2.3)
with its identity IDi and signature Si.
Aggregate Message
An aggregate message is a combination of the sender message and trust opinions.
For example,
A = [M, ID0, O1, . . . , On, ID1, . . . , IDn, AGGR(S0, S1, . . . , Sn)] (2.4)
is an aggregate from the sender message M ′ = [M, ID0, S0] and trust opinions from n direct
evaluators Vi : O
′
i = [M,Oi, IDi, Si] where i ∈ [1, n].
In our system, the size of an aggregate message increases with the number of collected
feedbacks. Considering that the size of an aggregate message cannot grow infinitely large
due to the limited packet payload2, we require that trust opinions should not be appended
to the aggregate message once its maximum size is reached – by doing so, we may lose
subsequent trust opinions but an adequate number of previous trust opinions are preserved,
whose feedbacks are usually more confident and sufficient for message evaluation.
AGGR is our signature aggregation scheme. Flexible aggregation is necessary to allow
that any third party can perform an aggregation. Secure aggregation is needed to ensure
no data repudiation. Meanwhile, efficient aggregation is appreciated to minimize the extra
information for signature verification. Such an aggregation scheme is illustrated in Chapter
2In computer networks, a network packet contains two parts: the header that indicates the source and
destination as well as other meta information, and the payload which is the actual data being transmitted.
10
3, where any third party can combine multiple signatures into one aggregate signature,
achieving both flexibility and efficiency without compromising security.
An Example
A vehicle V0 discovered a car accident and broadcast a sender message M
′ = [M, ID0, S0],
where M is the message containing the event description “car accident”, sender confidence,
time and location where V0 spotted the accident, ID0 is V0’s digital identity, and S0 is the
signature on [M, ID0].
Not to lose generality, we assume there are another two vehicles near V0, namely V1
and V2. V1 receives the message M
′ and provides a trust opinion with a trust reaction and
0.8 confidence, while V2 distrusts the message M
′ and provides a distrust reaction and 0.5
confidence. The trust opinion from V1 is O
′
1 = [M,O1, ID1, S1], where O1 = [trust, 0.8], ID1
is the identity of V1, and S1 is the signature on [M,O1, ID1]. Similarly, the trust opinion
from V2 is O
′
2 = [M,O2, ID2, S2], where O2 = [¬trust, 0.5].
Aggregation on M ′, O1 and O2 can be done by any third party and these messages are
aggregated into the aggregate message A = [M, ID0, O1, O2, ID1, ID2, AGGR(S0, S1, S2)].
Please note that the actual proposed aggregation data format is slightly different from the
example here. We leave the details of message aggregation to Chapter 3.
2.1.2 System Components
We design our system based on several components, as shown in Figure 2.3.
Message evaluation contains two modules: analysis module and action module. The
analysis module is where trust opinions are generated. The module analyzes the message
validity, correctness and accuracy based on local knowledge, and attempts to provide a trust
opinion of either “trust” or “distrust”. If a trust opinion can be provided, it is broadcast
11
 









Cluster Cooperation Action Module 
Relay Control Model 
Figure 2.3: System Framework
and appended to the message. The action module is where a local decision (trust or
distrust) is made. The peer derives a local action using a trust-based computation model
in Section 2.2.2.
Message propagation consists of two components: cluster cooperation and the relay
control model. Based on cluster-based routing mechanisms, the cluster cooperation serves
as the foundation that makes the message propagation and trust aggregation possible. The
relay control model works as a filter that controls the relay of messages based on a trust
model in Section 2.4.2.
The trust opinion aggregation scheme ensures that message evaluation and propagation
can be done with little interference on each other. It provides high flexibility that during
message propagation, trust opinions can be aggregated in a secure and efficient fashion.
We show the detail of trust opinion aggregation in Chapter 3.
Peer-to-peer trust module manages the trust of peers. Inspired by the work by Minhas
et al. [20], we employ two types of trust: role-based trust and experience-based trust. A
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small minority of vehicles are assigned to a specific role and a role-based trust, such as
police cars. For other vehicles, they are associated with an experience-based trust. Each
peer maintains a list of experience-based trust for other peers.
The central authority is an offline entity which 1) assigns roles and updates role-based
trust; 2) collects distributed experience trust from peers; 3) computes a global experience
trust for all peers, and offers an up-to-date copy for download; 4) praises or punishes peers
according to their behaviors in the network.
We show in the following the details of each component except for the central authority
module. The work in [21] provides a sound approach to the computation of global trust
from distributed local trust, which is an appendix to our work here.
2.2 Message Evaluation
2.2.1 Analysis Module
The analysis module works on the generation of trust opinion upon message reception.
The purpose and data design of trust opinions is described in Section 2.1.1. One important
hardware design principle is that the trust opinion should always be generated before any
disclosure of the existing trust opinions in the message. In other words, the generation
of the trust opinion is purely based on the peer’s local knowledge, such as the direct
observation. By doing so, we are capable of coping with gambling peers who give trust
opinions by strategically guessing the message trustworthiness from others’ trust opinions,
so as to quickly and maliciously increase their trust.
For example, upon reception of an aggregate message, the gambling peer gives a “trust”
reaction if there are more peers who trust the message in the list of trust opinions; other-
wise, the gambling peers gives a “distrust” reaction. Because our system praises peers of
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honesty, if the majority of peers are honest, the gambling peer could get praised by simply
following the opinion of the majority.
The design of such an analysis module would involve much concern from the perspec-
tive of hardware design, such as tamper-proof devices, car sensors and human-computer
interactive interfaces. For now, we assume the existence of such an analysis module. The
design of which is beyond our work scope and left for future.
2.2.2 Action Module
The action module works on the local actions taken towards the message. A local action
can be derived from the trust opinions in the message. Specifically, an aggregate message
trustworthiness is computed and mapped to a set of actions {trust,¬trust}3.
Let A denote the aggregate message, s denote the original sender, P (trust) = {i| IDi ∈
A and Oi = [trust, ci] ∈ A} denote the peers who contribute trust opinions of “trust”
reactions, and P (¬trust) = {i| IDi ∈ A and Oi = [¬trust, ci] ∈ A} denote the peers with
“distrust” reactions. Let tA denote the aggregate trustworthiness of aggregate message A.









1 + |P (trust)|+ |P (¬trust)|
(2.5)
where cs ∈ [0, 1] is the sender confidence in the sender message, and ci ∈ [0, 1] is the
confidence in the trust opinion given by peer i. It is obvious to prove that tA ∈ (−1, 1].
When the message A is fully distrusted, we have cs = 0, P (trust) = ∅, and ci = 1 for
i ∈ P (¬trust), and thus tA → −1. When tA = 1, we have cs = ci = 1 for i ∈ P (trust) and
P (¬trust) = ∅ which indicates that the message is fully trusted by peers.
3The distinction of trust and distrust has been introduced and modeled in previous research in artificial
intelligence, such as the work by Tran [22].
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Considering that the sender is a different role from those who provide trust opinions,
we employ a sender weight factor γ > 0 that determines how much weight is placed on the









γ + |P (trust)|+ |P (¬trust)|
(2.6)
The value of γ can be customized by each peer in the network. Setting γ to a larger
value indicates that the peer places more trust on the sender. The case γ = 1 amounts to
Equation 2.5.
Next, we employ the peer-to-peer trust module here. Each peer i is associated with a
trust metric Ti ∈ [0, 1], which is defined in Section 2.3. We combine the trust of each peer

















where τ ∈ [0, 1] is the trust threshold customized by each peer p. The trust threshold
helps filter trust opinions from those peers that are not highly trusted. τ can be set to a
higher value close to 1 so that only trust opinions from highly trusted peers are trusted.
In practice, the value of τ should be determined by the availability of trust opinions. For
example, τ can be set higher when a larger number of trust opinions are available.
Last, the action module implements a mapping faction : TA → {trust,¬trust} that
maps the message trustworthiness to an action:
faction =
 trust , if tA ≥ ϕ¬trust , if tA < ϕ (2.8)
where ϕ ∈ [−1, 1] is the action threshold. The value of ϕ can be personalized by each peer:
a higher action threshold indicates the peer is more “cautious” of trusting other peers and
vice versa.
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Special case: under the situation where the traffic is extremely sparse, both P (trust)
and P (¬trust) may be ∅ and the message only contains the sender’s identity. If we simply





where the trust of the sender is eliminated and thus not considered. So in order for the
action module to trust the message, along with the previous requirement in Equation 2.8
that tA ≥ ϕ, we further require that the action module can trust the message only if
Ts ≥ τ .
As a summary, we show how our action module works in the following pseudocode.
Algorithm 1 Action Module
1: VA ⇐ verify A.
2: if VA = false then
3: return ¬trust.
4: else
5: compute the value of tA using Equation 2.7.
6: if tA < φ then
7: return ¬trust.
8: else
9: if P (trust) = ∅ and P (¬trust) = ∅ then








2.3 Peer-to-Peer Trust Module
In this section we present the peer-to-peer trust module proposed by Minhas et al. [20].
Each peer’s trust is evaluated by a trust metric: either a role-based trust, or an experience-
based trust. Let Ti ∈ [0, 1] denote the peer-to-peer trust of peer i, we have
Ti =
 Trole(i) if peer i has a role,f(Texp(i, p)) otherwise. (2.10)
where Trole(i) ∈ [0, 1] is the role-based trust of peer i, and Texp(i, p) ∈ [−1, 1] is the
experience-based trust of peer i from peer p’s perspective. Since the values of Trole and
Texp have different ranges, we map the value of Texp to the same range of Trole by employing
the function f(x) = (x + 1)/2. Please note that we simply employ a mapping function
here to map the values to the same range, although there could be other better mapping
functions. We leave the work of developing these mapping functions to the future.
2.3.1 Role-based Trust
It is known that although most vehicles are for personal purposes, a small number of
entities have their specific responsibilities in the traffic system, e.g, police cars. Roles are
assigned to them and it is reasonable to assign multiple levels of trust to different roles.
The underlying assumption is that vehicles of the same role would behave in a similar way
so that any third party can estimate their trust level before any interaction happens. The
roles and role-based trust values in our system are fixed by the offline central authority. To
demonstrate the utilization of role-based peer trust, we define three different roles, from
the highest to the lowest trust:
1. Authority, such as police cars, traffic controllers, and road-side units which serve as
part of road infrastructure, and so on.
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2. Public Services, which could be ambulance, fire truck, school bus, public transits,
road maintenance cars, etc.
3. Professional Cars, e.g. driver training vehicles, cars whose drivers have ten years of
safe driving experience, etc.
We denote the role-based trust of peer i as Trole(i), where Trole : ID → [0, 1]; 1 means
absolute trust and 0 represents absolute distrust. The vehicle identity can be mapped to
its role and then the role-based trust. In practice, vehicles periodically download from
central authority an up-to-date list of roles, each with a list of vehicle identities.
2.3.2 Experience-based Trust
For most of the vehicles who do not have a role, we use the experience-based peer trust
to dynamically reflect a peer’s trustworthiness in the system. The behavior of a peer is
evaluated by other peers, each of whom maintains the trust for a list of peers in the system.
The list of trust is preserved in peer’s local repository, and loosely synchronized with the
central authority who collects, analyzes these lists, and reaches a decision on praising or
punishing certain peers.
The peer updates the trust for others by comparing their messages to its own experience.
More specifically, upon reception of an aggregate message, the peer may not have the direct
experience to judge the trustworthiness of message. However, after some time when direct
experience becomes available, the peer can updates the trust for those who either reported
or evaluated the event.
For instance, peer X is the original sender of a fake message M . Peer Y receives the
message and immediately finds out it is fake. It appends its own trust opinion to M and
updates the trust of X. The trust of X with respect to Y is now reduced. And then the
message M arrives at Z, whose analysis module cannot judge the trustworthiness due to
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lack of direct observations. The action module of Z derives a local action for Z but this
does not account for any experience here. And soon, Z obtains its direct observation and
realizes that X’s message is not true and Y ’s opinion is valid. It will update both X and
Y ’s trust values. The trust value of X with respect to Z is decreased, and the trust of Y
with respect to Z is increased.
Motivated by the model of Minhas et al. [20], we denote the peer p’s trust from k’s
perspective as Texp(p, k), whose value is scaled to [−1, 1] :−1 means absolute distrust and
1 means absolute trust. We simplify the notation of Texp(p, k) as T in the following. Peer
k increases the trust of p by
T ←
 λt(1− cα)T + cα if T ≥ 0λ−t(1 + cα)T + cα if T < 0 (2.11)
if p acts honestly, otherwise decreases T by
T ←
 λt(1 + cβ)T − cβ if T ≥ 0λ−t(1− cβ)T − cβ if T < 0 (2.12)
where α, β ∈ (0, 1) are increment and decrement factors, c ∈ [0, 1] is the confidence value
placed by p in the message, λ ∈ (0, 1) is a forgetting factor, and t ∈ [0, 1] is the time
closeness between the current interaction and the previous one.
As explained by Minhas et al. [20], the values of α and β should be subjective to the
road situations and message types. For example, when traffic is sparse, these values should
be set larger, considering the number of messages is low. For emergency related events, the
values should be larger so as to increase or decrease peer trust more rapidly. Besides, as
proposed by Minhas et al. [20] and introduced by Tran [22], it is appreciated that β > α
based on the common assumption that peer trust is difficult to build up but easy to tear
down.
The Equation 2.11 and 2.12 are extended from the work of Tran [22]. Compare to
Tran’s work, we add the confidence c as an factor because peers, including the sender, play
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different roles in the message’s trustworthiness by placing different confidence values. This
can be explained by the design of Equation 2.7, which computes the message’s aggregate
trustworthiness from a peer’s trust and confidence. For example, between two peers with
the same peer-to-peer trust, the one who has placed a confidence c = 1 is making greater
impact than the other with a confidence c = 0.1. Consequently, those with higher confi-
dence would increase or decrease their trust faster than those with lower confidence. In
other words, if a peer provides a correct trust opinion, it should be praised by how much
confidence it has placed in the message – the higher confidence value it gives, the more it
should be praised. This also applies to the other direction, i.e. the punishment when a
peer gives a wrong trust opinion.
Following the proposal of Minhas et al. [20], we also model the time closeness t as
t =
 (tc − te)/tmax if tc − te < tmax1 otherwise (2.13)
where tc is the current time and te is the event time in the message; tmax is the maximum
time for a peer to totally forget the experience that happened before time tc − tmax. The
value of tmax is dependent on the frequency of the interactions between two peers in the




In a decentralized network where peers are independent from each other, it is hard to define
a strategy to effectively and efficiently collect trust opinions and propagate aggregate mes-
sages. Specifically, it is difficult to provide a strategy that defines to which (geographical)
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scale and in which fashion that trust opinions can be collected, packed and relayed in one
aggregate message.
To achieve a scalable message and trust opinion aggregation, we rely on the cluster-
based data routing model, whose example is shown in Figure 2.4. A number of cluster-based
routing protocols have been proposed and studied in mobile ad-hoc networks [23, 24, 25] and
vehicular networks [26, 27, 28]. One common goal of the protocols in vehicular networks is
to achieve scalability for the vehicle-to-vehicle messaging. By grouping peers into multiple
clusters, the system becomes scalable by having message relay done between cluster leaders
instead of between two neighboring peers. The latter relay method is not scalable because
the messaging between all pairs of neighboring peers will result in channel congestion and
thus reversely threshold the scalability.
Our proposed cluster cooperation scheme relies on existing cluster-based routing proto-
cols in vehicular networks [26, 27, 28], and extends them in two aspects. First, clusters are
used to aggregate trust opinions. Trust opinions from peers in the cluster are aggregated
and propagated along with the message itself. We will explain this with our example in the
following context. Second, we employ the majority opinion computed from trust opinions
as the decision of relay control model, which is introduced in Section 2.4.2.
In our example shown in Figure 2.4, vehicles are geographically grouped into 10 clusters,
from C1 to C10
4. For each cluster Ci, a vehicle is randomly chosen as cluster leader Li (the
black nodes). Our scheme requires that the cooperation among neighboring cluster leaders
is pre-established to help build an intra-cluster link topology (the graph with dashed arrows
connecting neighboring black peers) so that message can be relayed from one cluster to
another. Sender S in cluster C1 broadcasts a message M to its members who give their
feedbacks Oi immediately afterwards. And then, the cluster leader L1 collects Oi and
aggregates them into the aggregate message A. L1 sends A to the next hop clusters C2, C3















C2 C5 C8 
C9 C7 C4 
C1 
C3 C6 C10 
Figure 2.4: Cluster-based Message Propagation
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and C4. Upon reception of A, the cluster leader (e.g. L4 here) broadcasts A to its cluster
members, collects their trust opinions (if any), aggregates them together with existing A
into the new aggregate A′ , computes a relaying decision, and decides whether to relay A′
to the next hop cluster C5, C6 and C7.
2.4.2 Relay Control Model
While traditional routing algorithms [15] of vehicular networks use “time-to-live” or “hop-
to-live” as a relay decision, our decision is built on the majority opinion – a message trusted
by the majority should be relayed; otherwise it is to be dropped. This idea is motivated
by the modeling of trust proposed by Minhas et al. [20] where majority opinion is used to
judge the overall decision. Compared to their work where the time closeness and location
closeness are considered as part of a peer’s opinion, we use the confidence in the trust
opinion and the peer-to-peer trust as the peer’s opinion, as is shown in Equation 2.14 and
2.15.
Besides, considering that trustworthiness of messages ages with the time and distance
– the longer time elapses, the further away the event incurs, the less accurate and reliable
the data becomes – we further use a mapping function fmax : Λ × Θ → Mt ×Md which
maps the sender role Λ and the event Θ to the maximum time-to-live Mt and longest
propagation distance Md. We define such a mapping function because it is reasonable to
set up different thresholds to multiple types of messages and types of senders. Take the
distance Md for an example: a piece of weather information (infotainment event) can have
a propagation area of 10 square miles while a life-critical message (safety-related event),
e.g. “sudden brake” may only be useful within a distance of 200 meters. Similarly, the
message from an authority role should propagate as far as possible. However, those not
highly trusted senders should have their messages propagate less further than the messages
from highly trusted peers.
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In practice, when the cluster leader receives an aggregate message A from previous
cluster, it broadcasts A to cluster members, collects trust opinions (if any) and generates
new aggregate A′ (A′ ← A+O1 + . . .+Ok+ . . .). The leader computes the majority opinion
from A′ and then makes a relay decision.
Computing the Majority Opinion
The majority opinion is based on the weight of majority trust and majority distrust. Let
P (trust) = {i| IDi ∈ A′ and Oi = [trust, ci] ∈ A′}, and P (¬trust) = {i| IDi ∈ A′ and Oi =
[¬trust, ci] ∈ A′}.










where τ is the trust threshold set by p, ci ∈ [0, 1] is the confidence given by peer i, and Ti
is the peer-to-peer trust. Messages can be relayed only if
Wtrust
Wtrust +W¬trust
> 1− ε (2.16)
where ε ∈ [0, 1] is a threshold set by the system to denote the maximum error rate allowed.
ε is embedded in the protocol and can be adaptive to the current environments, situations
and data types. For example, for more critical messages such as car accidents, a lower
error rate is appreciated; for weather information, a higher error rate can be allowed.
Making a Relay Decision
Apart from the majority opinion, a relay decision is also based on the following parameters:
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md – the maximum propagation distance;
mt – the longest time to live;
∆d – the distance between current location and event location;
∆t – the time that has elapsed since the event;
A relayer does the following:
1. verify message A; in case verification fails, drop A;
2. compute the majority opinion, drop A if Equation 2.16 does not hold;
3. compute ∆d,md,∆t,mt, if ∆d > md or ∆t > mt , drop A;
4. generate A′ and relay A′ to the next hop clusters.
As a summary, we show how our relay control module works in the following pseudocode
in Algorithm 2.
2.5 Presence of Authority
In the presence of authority, the system adapts itself in the following aspects:
1. Messages from authority roles are trusted and propagated to the maximum distance.
All trust opinions will be ignored in message evaluation and propagation.
2. Trust opinions from authority are followed as the guidance to action module. In other
words, the action module simply follows the trust opinion from authority without
computing the aggregated trustworthiness of the message.
3. Authority’s trust opinion serves as an guidance to the relay control model. If the
authority roles provide a trust opinion for the message, the relay model simply follows
the decision of authority.
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Algorithm 2 Relay Control Module
1: VA ⇐ verify A upon reception of message A.
2: if VA = false then
3: return drop.
4: else
5: broadcast A to cluster members.
6: collect trust opinions Oi from cluster members.
7: generate A′ ⇐ A+Oi + . . ..
8: compute routing decision r using Equation 2.16.
9: if r = relay then










4. The role-based trust for authority is the highest and fixed as 1.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present a trust-based message evaluation and propagation model for
vehicular networks. Message evaluation is conducted during its propagation, and reversely
affects message propagation through the relay control model, whose relay decisions are
determined by majority opinions, using a trust-based computational approach. The peer-
to-peer trust is modeled to reflect the honesty of entities in the network. Based on that, our
evaluation metric computes the message trustworthiness from a set of trust opinions. In
the next chapter, we are going to present an aggregation scheme, which resolves the issues




Secure and Efficient Trust Opinion
Aggregation
In this chapter, we introduce a secure and efficient trust opinion aggregation scheme in
mobile ad-hoc networks, typically in vehicular networks here. The outline of this chapter is
organized as follows. Key issues and challenges in trust opinion aggregation are identified
in Section 3.1. After that, we introduce our extended identity-based aggregation scheme
in Section 3.2, and summarize our scheme in Section 3.3.
3.1 Key Issues in Trust Opinion Aggregation
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of trust opinion aggregation. The topology of aggregation
is based on cluster-based message routing mechanism. Trust opinions are aggregated when
message M from peer S propagates from cluster C1 to C7. Let Si denote the set of opinions
from peers in cluster Ci, i.e. Si = {Ok| peer pk generates trust opinion Ok, and pk ∈ Ci}.
The cluster leader of C1 receives the message M and a set of trust opinions S1, combines
them into an aggregate message A = [M,S1], and then sends A to the next hop clusters.
For the cluster leader of Ci, i ∈ [2, 7], it receives several aggregate messages from previous
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hops, combines them into a new aggregate, broadcasts it to cluster members, collects trust
opinions if there is any, combines these trust opinions into a newer aggregate, and relays





















M, S1, S2 
M, S1, S3 
M, S1, S4 M, S1, S2, S5 
M, S1, S3, S4, S6 
M, S1, S4 
M, S1, S4 
Figure 3.1: Trust Opinion Aggregation
We realize that the system must be able to resolve several important issues in security
and efficiency before a workable trust opinion aggregation is available, detailed as below.
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Secure Aggregation
Security is an important factor in the design of some network systems. All data in the
vehicular network need to be protected from attackers, because attacks are possible dur-
ing the aggregation of trust opinions, such as data repudiation where trust opinions are
modified by a malicious relayer, and sybil attack where messages are sent under arbitrarily
forged identities or under the identity of another innocent peer [30]. Due to the above
concerns, it is required that all data are signed before sent so that 1) data repudiation can
be easily detected by verifying the data against with sender’s signature; 2) message sender,
or trust opinion provider cannot deny its message because of the existence of its signature;
3) identities cannot be forged or abused because each message is mapped to a valid and
unique identity – the only peer who is able to sign the message.
Efficient Aggregation
Given the fact that the necessity of signature schemes in vehicular networks is commonly
agreed on by both academia and industry, we realize that security and efficiency are two
contradictory aspects in vehicular networks, as it is difficult to achieve one aspect without
degrading the other. In our system, it is important for us to preserve the necessary security,
but at the same time, to maximize efficiency to render the aggregation scalable.
Here, the efficiency in trust opinion aggregation consists of two aspects: 1) time effi-
ciency, the time needed to perform an aggregation; 2) space efficiency, the size needed to
aggregate all trust opinions and signatures. Our concern is that previous work on data
aggregation may become inefficient in either space or time cost when it comes to our trust
opinion aggregation scenario. As a result, we appreciate an efficient aggregation scheme
that achieves both time efficiency and space efficiency. We will present the related work in
data aggregation in Chapter 5.2 (typically, the secure data aggregation methods in Chapter
5.2.1), and compare secure data aggregation methods to our proposed aggregation scheme
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in Chapter 4.4.
Identity-based Aggregate Signature Algorithm
In this chapter, we propose an aggregation scheme that is based on the existing identity-
based aggregate signature algorithm [31]. Specifically, the identity-based aggregate signa-
ture algorithm works as follows. Given a message M and n peers, each peer i signs the
message M into Mi = [M, IDi, Gi] for i ∈ [1, n], where IDi is the identity of peer i and
Gi is the signature by peer i. An aggregator computes G
′ =
∑n
i=1Gi and generates the
aggregated message A = [M, ID1, . . . , IDn, G
′]. The computation and summation of Gi is
implemented over bilinear groups constructed from the modified Weil pairing over elliptic
curves [32].
Our aggregation scheme featuring the employment of the identity-based aggregate sig-
nature algorithm improves both space efficiency and time efficiency. On one hand, space
efficiency is achieved because all signatures are aggregated into one signature that remains
in constant size. On the other hand, the inherent nature of identity-based signature does
not rely on an aggregation chain as previous approaches do. Messages can be efficiently
aggregated in the fixed time and thus time efficiency is achieved.
However, the original identity-based aggregate signature algorithm may not be directly
ported to here because of the specific aggregation issues in vehicular networks. One issue
with the aggregate signature algorithm is that it can only aggregate signatures Gi on one
single message M as shown by the above example. Specifically, each peer i signs the same
message M into its signature Gi, and the aggregate signature algorithms works correctly in
computing the aggregate signature G′ =
∑
Gi. However, the algorithm does not provide a
method on how to aggregate signatures when it comes to our aggregation scenario where
the signatures are signed by peers on their own messages Mi, which are different because
they are either the sender message M or trust opinions Oi. Consequently, we need an
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aggregate signature algorithm that is capable of correctly combining the signatures for
multiple messages into one aggregate signature.
Another issue that impedes the original identity-based aggregate signature algorithm
from working correctly is the signature redundancy. We explain the concept of signature
redundancy using the example in Figure 3.1 where the relayer of C6 receives two aggregate
messages from C3 and C4. The two aggregates share a duplicate set of trust opinions S1 and
each signature on the trust opinion in S1 has a redundant copy. Elimination of duplicate
trust opinions is necessary to improve space efficiency, but the original aggregate signature
algorithm fails to verify the aggregate signature because it requires that each signer is a
unique identity. In other words, if we have a pair of duplicate signatures, say Gi and Gj by
IDi, the aggregate signature G
′ is not verifiable. We need an aggregate signature algorithm
that keeps G′ verifiable under the case where IDi = IDj for any i, j ∈ [1, n] and i 6= j.
In short, our scheme combines multiple messages and their signatures securely and
improves the aggregation efficiency. Besides, redundant trust opinions can be eliminated
with redundant signatures appropriately merged into an existing signature, which remains
valid and verifiable.
3.2 Our Extended Identity-based Aggregation Scheme
In this section, we illustrate an identity-based aggregation scheme that extends the identity-
based aggregate signature algorithm [31]. To start with, we explain the basic concept of
identity-based signature and aggregate signature, and introduce the “Bilinear Maps” which
serves as the mathematical foundation of the aggregate signature scheme. After that, we
show our trust opinion aggregation scheme in details: system setup, message and trust
opinion signing, trust opinion aggregation, signature verification, and proof of correctness.
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3.2.1 Preliminaries
An identity-based signature is a signature scheme where the user’s identity is used to
generate its public key. The identity is a short binary string constructed from what uniquely
identifies a user – could be the email address, social insurance number, etc. In a vehicular
network setting, we can assume each car has a unique ID issued by the central authority.
Given an ID of a vehicle, the central authority computes the unique private key and securely
distributes it to the corresponding vehicle.
An aggregate signature is a single short binary string which convinces the verifier that
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, signer Si signed the message Mi where the n signers and n messages can
be distinct and independent from each other. Instead of keeping n distinct signatures
as traditional signature schemes do, the aggregate signature is one single signature that
compacts n signatures.
Bilinear Maps
Let G be a cyclic additive group generated by P , and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group.
G and GT have the same prime order q, i.e., |G| = |GT | = q. Let ê : G × G → GT be a
bilinear map, which satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinear: for all P,Q,R ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z, ê(Q,P + R) = ê(P + R,Q) = ê(P,Q) ·
ê(R,Q). In particular, ê(aP, bP ) = ê(P, bP )a = ê(aP, P )b = ê(P, P )ab.
• Non-degenerate: there exists P,Q ∈ G such that ê(P,Q) 6= 1GT .
• Computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P,Q) for any P,Q ∈ G.
Such a bilinear map ê, which is often called an admissible pairing, can be constructed
by the modified Weil pairings on elliptic curves [32]. The groups (G and GT ) on such a
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map are called bilinear groups, where Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is easy to resolve
but Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is believed to be hard [32]. E.g., given any
a, b, c ∈ Zq and P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G, there exists an efficient algorithm to determine whether
ab = c by checking if ê(aP, bP ) = ê(P, cP ) holds. However, it is theoretically hard to
compute abP ∈ G.
3.2.2 System Setup
The central authority (CA) generates the system parameters as shown below:
1. generates groups G and GT of order q, an admissible pairing ê : G×G→ GT ;
2. chooses an arbitrary generator P ∈ G;
3. chooses a random s ∈ Z/qZ, and computes Q = sP ;
4. chooses three hash functions H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Z/qZ.
The system parameters {G,GT , ê, P,Q,H1, H2, H3} are made public. The secret kept by
CA is s ∈ Z/qZ.
Next, CA generates the public key Ki and private key ki for each vehicle Vi. Given a
vehicle Vi with IDi, the CA generates two pairs of keys (Ki,0, ki,0) and (Ki,1, ki,1), where
Ki,j = H1(IDi, j), ki,j = sKi,j, j ∈ {0, 1}.
Let Ki = Ki,0||Ki,1 and ki = ki,0||ki,1, where || denotes concatenation. Please note that
both Ki and ki are unique for each vehicle vi. Given an IDi any third party can compute
Ki but ki can only be generated by the CA.
3.2.3 Message and Trust Opinion Signing
There are two types of identities who sign messages: 1) the sender, who is the message
originator; and 2) the evaluator, who gives a trust opinion. We explain how they sign their
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messages in the following two cases.
Case 1: a vehicle V0 is the message originator, who signs its message M as follow:
1. computes PM = H2(M) ∈ G;
2. computes h0 = H3(M, ID0) ∈ Z/qZ;
3. generates a random r0 ∈ Z/qZ and initiates c0 = 1 ∈ Z;
4. computes S0 = r0PM + c0k0,0 + c0h0k0,1, T0 = r0P ;
5. generates the signed message M0 = [M, c0, ID0, S0, T0].
Case 2: a vehicle Vi evaluates the message M , generates its trust opinion Oi, and signs
M and Oi as follow:
1. computes PM = H2(M) ∈ G;
2. computes hi = H3(M,Oi, IDi) ∈ Z/qZ;
3. generates a random ri ∈ Z/qZ and initiates ci = 1 ∈ Z;
4. computes Si = riPM + ciki,0 + cihiki,1, Ti = riP ;
5. generates the signed message: Mi = [M,Oi, ci, IDi, Si, Ti].
The computation of Si and Ti is implemented over the group G. The combination of both
Si and Ti serves as the signature for the message M (case 1) or M and Oi (case 2).
35
3.2.4 Trust Opinion Aggregation
We explain how our scheme aggregates trust opinions under two cases. Case 1 applies to
the situation when there are no duplicate trust opinions or signatures while case 2 handles
the signature redundancy.
Case 1: a third party V ′ combines the original signed message with n signed trust opinions
from n distinct nodes. Specifically, we have:










and generates the aggregate
A′ = [M,O1, . . . , On, c0, c1, . . . , cn, ID0, ID1, . . . , IDn, S
′, T ′] (3.2)
The summation of Si and Ti is implemented over the group G.
Case 2: a third party V ′ wants to combine two aggregates on the same message M into
a larger aggregate, and it is possible that there exist duplicate trust opinions. Please
note that instead of merging aggregates on different messages, our system only combines
multiple aggregates for the same message M . Not to lose generality, we assume that V ′
receives the following aggregates:
A1 =

M,O1, . . . , Op, Op+1, . . . , Op+k,
c0,1, c1,1, . . . , cp,1, cp+1,1, . . . , cp+k,1,







M,Op+1, . . . , Op+k, Op+k+1, . . . , Op+k+q,
c0,2, cp+1,2, . . . , cp+k,2, cp+k+1,2, . . . , cp+k+q,2,
ID0, IDp+1, . . . , IDp+k, IDp+k+1, . . . , IDp+k+q,
S2, T2
 (3.4)
where A1 and A2 share k duplicate trust opinions, i.e. Op+i for i ∈ [1, k]. Please note that
for i ∈ {0} ∪ [p + 1, p + k], IDi may have different ci values in A1 and A2 due to various
paths of aggregation, so we denote them as ci,1 and ci,2.
V ′ computes S ′ = S1 + S2, T
′ = T1 + T2,
c′i =

ci,1 , for i ∈ [1, p]
ci,1 + ci,2 , for i ∈ {0} ∪ [p+ 1, p+ k]
ci,2 , for i ∈ [p+ k + 1, p+ k + q]
(3.5)
and generates the new aggregate
A′ =

M,O1, . . . , Op, Op+1, . . . , Op+k, Op+k+1, . . . , Op+k+q,
c′0, c
′








p+k+1, . . . , c
′
p+k+q,
ID0, ID1, . . . , IDp, IDp+1, . . . , IDp+k, IDp+k+1, . . . , IDp+k+q,
S ′, T ′
 (3.6)
An Example
We give an example showing how aggregation on two aggregates works. Suppose we have
four vehicles V0, V1, V2, V3 where V0 is the original message sender, and two existing ag-
gregates A1 = [M,O1, O2, ID0, ID1, ID2, c0,1, c1,1, c2,1, S1, T1] that combines messages from
V0, V1, V2, and A2 = [M,O2, O3, ID0, ID2, ID3, c0,2, c2,2, c3,2, S2, T2] that combines messages
from V0, V2, V3. Both aggregates share a common trust opinion O2 that is duplicate. An
aggregator generates the new aggregates A′ as











where c′0 = c0,1 + c0,2, c
′
1 = c1,1, c
′
2 = c2,1 + c2,2, c
′
3 = c3,2 and S
′ = S1 + S2, T
′ = T1 + T2.
3.2.5 Signature Verification
Case 1: verify a signed message with no trust opinions yet. Given a signed message
M0 = [M, c0, ID0, S0, T0], the verifier checks if
ê(S0, P ) = ê(T0, PM)ê(Q, c0K0,0 + c0h0K0,1) (3.7)
holds, where P,Q are public system parameters, PM = H2(M), K0,j = H1(ID0, j) for
j ∈ {0, 1} and h0 = H3(M, ID0).
Case 2: verify an aggregate which contains the message M and trust opinions from n
distinct nodes. Given an aggregate
A = [M,O1, . . . , On, c0, c1, . . . , cn, ID0, ID1, . . . , IDn, Sn+1, Tn+1] (3.8)
where M is signed by vehicle ID0 and (M,Oi) is signed by vehicle IDi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the
verifier checks if the following equation holds:







where PM = H2(M), Ki,j = H1(IDi, j), for i ∈ [0, n], j ∈ {0, 1}, and h0 = H3(M, ID0), hi =
H3(M,Oi, IDi), for i ∈ [1, n].
3.2.6 Correctness
Case 1: the verification of a signature on a pure message without trust opinions.
Verify M0 = [M, c0, ID0, S0, T0].
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ê(S0, P )
= ê(r0PM + c0k0,0 + c0h0k0,1, P )
= ê(r0PM , P )ê(c0k0,0 + c0h0k0,1, P )
= ê(PM , r0P )ê(c0sK0,0 + c0h0sK0,1, P )
= ê(PM , r0P )ê(c0K0,0 + c0h0K0,1, sP )
= ê(PM , T0)ê(c0K0,0 + c0h0K0,1, Q)
= ê(T0, PM)ê(Q, c0K0,0 + c0h0K0,1)
Case 2: the verification of an aggregate of trust opinions.





























































Case 3: the verification of a merged aggregate A′ from aggregate A1 and A2, as shown in
Section 3.2.4.
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ê(S ′, P )
= ê(S1 + S2, P )
= ê(S1, P )ê(S2, P )
= ê(T1, PM)






















In this chapter, we present a secure, efficient and scalable trust opinion aggregation scheme
for our trust-based message evaluation and propagation model. Our aggregation scheme
extends the identity-based aggregate signature algorithm, and thus achieves high efficiency
and scalability without compromising security.
First and foremost of all, high security is reinforced throughout the aggregation pro-
cess, either it being prior-aggregation or posterior-aggregation. Second, our aggregation
method achieves high time efficiency since multiple signatures can be aggregated in one
pass by summing them up mathematically. High space efficiency is made possible in that
signatures are compacted into one aggregate signature, with additional information for ver-
41
ification minimized and redundancy eliminated. Third, our aggregation is flexible because
there is no negative effect and little difference on whomever and whenever to perform the
aggregation.




In this chapter, we present an evaluation of our trust-based message evaluation and prop-
agation model. System effectiveness and scalability are evaluated through simulation ex-
periments on vehicular network environments. After that, the scalability and efficiency
of our secure aggregation scheme are illustrated by comparing it to existing aggregation
methods.
4.1 Experiment Setup
Implemented in C++, our simulation tool allows us to simulate real life traffic scenarios by
employing real maps with vehicle entities following traffic rules, road limits, and a full list of
customizable parameters defined in our trust model. Compared to other existing vehicular
network simulation tools [33, 34, 35, 36], our tool is specially designed for trust modeling
and cluster-based messaging among potentially thousands of nodes, and thus achieves more
flexibility and consumes an incredibly low amount of computational resources.
We use a map of the East York area of Toronto, as shown in Figure 4.1. Roads are
partitioned into multiple road segments, and vehicles are clustered geographically by road
segments. We set the length of road segment to 0.5 kilometers, because peers within such
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Figure 4.1: Map for Simulating VANET
a distance can reliably communicate with each other, according to [1]. Vehicles are moving
in the map in any possible directions and in different speeds. Entering a new road segment
indicates that the peer is switching from one cluster to another.
We list parameters for our trust modeling in Table 4.1. The purposes and details of
these parameters have been introduced in Chapter 2. In our experiment, the sender weight
factor γ is set to 2 to double the weight of the sender in the message evaluation. Assuming
that peer dishonesty is well tolerated by the system, we set the peer’s trust threshold τ to
0.1, and the maximum error rate ε in relay control model to 0.8. We also set β/α = 10
based on the principle that trust is hard to build up but easy to tear down. Please note that
all these values may not be optimal. In our evaluation below, our focus is to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our model.
Additional parameters for simulating the vehicular network are listed in Table 4.2.
Our experiment simulates a total number of 1125 vehicle entities. We set 2% of them as
authority roles, such as police cars, road side units, and traffic controllers. The authority
entities are fully reliable and trustworthy, and alway capable to provide other peers with
valid observations and trust opinions.
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Table 4.1: Parameters for Trust Modeling
Parameter Description Value
γ sender weight factor 2
τ trust threshold 0.1
ϕ action threshold 0.2
α experience-trust increment factor 0.01
β experience-trust decrement factor 0.1
λ experience forgetting factor 0.95
tmax maximum time for experience (second) 100
ε error rate allowed for message relay 0.8
md maximum message propagation distance (km) 5.5
mt message’s longest time to live (second) 150
Table 4.2: Parameters for Vehicular Network Simulation
Parameter Description Value
percentage of authority roles 2%
average number of vehicles per cluster 5
probability of turning left/right at the cross 0.2
road segment length for one cluster 0.5 km
maximum distance for trust opinion 1 km
vehicle speed [15, 30] m/s, road dependent
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Average number of vehicles per cluster is set to 5 to reflect the road situation in regular
hours. The evaluation of effect of traffic density is left for future work. Vehicle speed is
dependent on weather condition, traffic density, and speed limit of the road. To simplify
our experiment, we assign a unique average speed to each road, where the vehicle’s speed
randomly varies ±10% from the average speed.
As mentioned in Chapter 2.2.1, the trust opinion is purely based on peer’s local knowl-
edge. In our experiment, we assume that all messages are observational. From this as-
sumption, we further assume that the analysis module can provide trust opinions only
when ∆d, the geographical distance between the event and the peer, is smaller than dmax,
the maximum distance for trust opinions. As a result, we can have the confidence value
in the trust opinion determined by the geographical closeness: the closer the event is, the
higher confidence value should be provided. In our experiment, confidence c is calculated
as
c =
 (dmax −∆d)/dmax if ∆d < dmax0 otherwise (4.1)
4.2 System Effectiveness
In this section, we evaluate the system effectiveness in terms of the capability for the system
to mitigate against malicious messages and protect peers from being affected. We define
the attack model as follow: attackers jeopardize the network by broadcasting misleading
messages on fake events, such as “traffic congestion here”, so as to cheat peers and maximize
their own interest.
One of our evaluation metrics is the “average number of wrong actions per peer”. An
instance of “wrong action” indicates that one malicious message is trusted by a certain
peer whose action module computes an answer of “trust” instead of “distrust” for the
misleading event.
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Extra parameters for evaluating system effectiveness are listed in Table 4.3. 10% of
Table 4.3: Extra Parameters for Evaluation of System Effectiveness
Parameter Description Value
percentage of malicious peers 10%
frequency of malicious messages 30 seconds / message
analysis module’s detection rate uniform distribution, [0.05, 0.95]
peers in the system are attackers, each of whom sends a malicious message after every 30
seconds, which is approximately the time of driving from one cluster to another. Consid-
ering that the analysis module generates trust opinions, we define the detection rate drate
as follow:
drate = Pr{D|M}, D is a successful detection given a malicious message M . (4.2)
The analysis module generates a trust opinion of “distrust” upon a successful detection,
otherwise “trust”, maliciousness undetected. To better reflect the real situation, we assume
that the capability to detect malicious messages varies among peers. In our experiment,
the peer’s detection rate follows the uniform distribution in [0.05, 0.95], except for those
authority roles, whose detection rate is highest and fixed to 1.
4.2.1 Effect of Trust Opinions
In this section, we begin with the effect of trust opinions. We demonstrate how much the
system effectiveness is improved by comparing the average number of wrong actions under
three trust opinion modes, as follow:
1. No trust opinions. The action module ignores all trust opinions and makes a local
action by itself: when the peer is within the maximum distance where a trust opinion
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is available, the action module follows the reaction of analysis module – if the analysis
module trusts the message, the action model follows it, and vice versa. Otherwise,
the peer simply trusts the message.
2. Trust opinions plus majority-based voting. The action module computes a local ac-
tion from majority consensus, which can be reached by voting among all trust opin-
ions without considering the trustworthiness of peers included in the trust opinions.
The computation of the majority consensus follows Equation 2.6.
3. Trust opinions plus experience-based trust, which is what we have introduced in our
model. A local action is computed from trust opinions, by not only considering the
majority consensus, but also applying each peer’s trustworthiness as the weight of
its vote. This is what we have proposed in Equation 2.7.
The effect of three trust opinion modes is illustrated in Figure 4.2. We run the simu-
lation for a duration of 60 minutes and sample the data after every 5 minutes. Each peer
makes an average number of approximately 46 wrong actions if trust opinions are excluded.
However, this number drastically drops to 19 (i.e. by 65%) if trust opinions are considered.
Compared to majority-based voting on trust opinions, the employment of experience-
based trust further decreases the number of wrong actions globally as the system evolves.
This is because once a peer obtains its own experience after being cheated by a malicious
message, it will update the experience-based trust for those who have provided trust opin-
ions for that message. The malicious sender’s trust is shortly decreased by continuously
sending malicious messages. At the same time, those weak detectors, who have a low detec-
tion rate and occasionally contribute wrong trust opinions, are becoming less trustworthy.
As a result, the action module improves its accuracy and correct decision rate by mitigating




































System Evolution Time (minute)
no trust opinion (original)
trust opinion + majority voting
trust opinion + experience
Figure 4.2: The Effect of Trust Opinions
4.2.2 Effect of Peer-to-Peer Trust
Next, we evaluate the effect of peer-to-peer trust model. Since peer-to-peer trust consists
of two components: role-based trust and experience-based trust, we compare the system
effectiveness under four cases: 1) Original situation. Actions are taken after conducting a
majority-based voting on trust opinions, peer-to-peer trust ignored. 2) Role-based trust.
The system will include authority roles, whose trust opinions are always followed by peers.
3) Experience-based trust. Peers are updating the trust for others as soon as personal
experience becomes available. 4) Role-based trust plus experience-based trust. This is the
combination of case 2 and 3.
In our trust model, the peer-to-peer trust is used in both the action module and the
relay control model. In order to demonstrate the effect of peer-to-peer trust on action
module, we evaluate the system effectiveness under two scenarios, namely without and
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with the relay control model, as shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. In the absence of
the relay control model, both good and bad messages are relayed to the furthest distance
without being dropped.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the two figures.
1. Role-based trust improves the system effectiveness in both scenarios, due to the fact
that authority roles are helpful in two ways. First, the trust opinion from authority is
always followed by the action module of peers. Since authority is always trustworthy
and of strong detection capability, the number of wrong actions is decreased. Second,
the trust opinion from authority determines whether a message is to be relayed or
dropped. When the relay control model is turned on, the propagation of malicious
messages is limited and thus the negative effect is restricted. This explains why role-
based trust decreases the number of wrong actions more in the scenario with relay
control than the one without relay control.
2. Experience-based trust improves the system effectiveness as well. As explained ear-
lier, peers accumulate experience and lower the experience-based trust for malicious
peers and weak detectors. As a result, the average number of wrong actions is grad-
ually decreased as system evolves. The performance of the both curves (exp and
role+exp) is about the same after 60 minutes, which indicates that the experience-
based trust plays a greater part in lowering the wrong decision rate than role-based
trust, as system evolves for a longer time.
3. When there is no experience-based trust or authority role, the effect of relay control
may be neglected, since there is little difference between the highest lines in both
figures. The explanation lies in the inherent nature of trust opinions. In most cases,
trust opinions aid peers to detect a malicious message, and thus further peers will
















































































rc + role + exp
Figure 4.4: The Effect of Peer-to-Peer Trust (with Relay Control)
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detect the maliciousness, most peers will fall victim due to trust opinions, and it is
highly unlikely that message will be dropped in the middle because the relayer itself
is highly likely to become a victim. At the same time, the experiment demonstrate
one important observation that, even if every relayer is an attacker that forwards the
malicious data, which amounts to no relay control, the system effectiveness is still
preserved with little affection by malicious relaying behaviors.
4.2.3 Social Impact v.s. Honesty
Instead of using the average number of wrong actions per peer, we use another evaluation
metric “number of deliveries” to demonstrate the system effectiveness from the perspective
of social impact. One delivery of the sender is defined as one message reception by some
receiver. We study the social impact of peers with different honesty levels. The honesty h
of a peer can be defined in possibly many ways, such as
h = (1− number of malicious messages sent
number of messages sent
)× 100% (4.3)
We set three honesty levels in our experiment, namely 100%, 50%, and 0% honesty.
Figure 4.5 shows the accumulative number of deliveries as system evolves. Three peers
are randomly chosen from the system, each assigned to a different honesty level. After a
simulation for 20 hours, it becomes obvious that the peer of 100% honesty has the largest
number of deliveries, since its messages are trusted and relayed to the longest distance.
The accumulative curve for 0% honesty ranks the lowest because most messages from fully
dishonest peers are restricted from propagation. It grows even slower as system evolves,
because peers become more experienced so that relay control model becomes more accurate
in filtering malicious messages.
Figure 4.6 is an alternative graph showing the social impact versus peer honesty. We














































































Figure 4.6: Number of Deliveries in Each Hour
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evolves for 20 hours. Similar to the observations in Figure 4.5, dishonest peers would have
less social impact than honest peers.
4.3 Scalability
In this section, we evaluate the system scalability. Our trust model can improve scalability
by relay control model, which detects and filters malicious messages during propagation.
First of all, we define the attack model as follow: different from those defined in Section
4.2, the attackers here abuse their local vehicular network by sending spams frequently,
which could be out-of-date information or repeated messages. Spams might not be mis-
leading as that in previous attacker model, but they take up a certain portion of wireless
resources and lower the utilization rate of available bandwidth, and thus should be treated
as malicious.
Extra parameters for the evaluation of scalability are listed in Table 4.4. Assuming that
spam is easier to detect than misleading messages as the pattern of spams has less variety,
we increase the detection rate of analysis module globally by setting it to the uniform
distribution from 0.4 to 1.0. We also include fewer attackers by setting the percentage
of spammers to 1%, each of whom sends one spam every 5 seconds, which is much more
frequent than misleading messages.
Table 4.4: Extra Parameters for Evaluation of Scalability
Parameter Description Value
percentage of spammers 1%
spam sending frequency 5 seconds / message
detection rate of analysis module uniform distribution, [0.4, 1.0]
Our evaluation of scalability features three metrics: average propagation distance of
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spam, average number of received messages per peer, and global relay effectiveness. Each
evaluation metric compares the performance among a subset of six predefined scenarios,
shown as follows:
1. Original. Without regard to the trustworthiness of messages, they are simply relayed
to the next hop, until the furthest allowed distance is reached.
2. Relay Control (RC). Whether a message is relayed or not is based on majority opinion,
which does not take the role-based and experience-based trust into consideration. In










compared to the Equation 2.14 and 2.15 in Chapter 2.
3. RC + Role. Role-based trust is taken into concern when relay control model computes
the majority opinion. Trust opinions from authority roles are strictly taken as the
relay decision.
4. RC + Exp. Experience-based trust is used as the weight of each peer in the compu-
tation of majority opinion.
5. RC + Role + Exp. A combination of scenario 3 and 4, which is our trust-based relay
control model.
6. 100% Detection, which is the ideal case that each peer is capable to thoroughly detect
any maliciousness, i.e. with detection rate drate = 1.0.
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4.3.1 Average Propagation Distance of Spam
One of our evaluation metrics for scalability is the average propagation distance of spam.
Assuming that the number of messages that can be relayed in a fixed period of time has an
upper bound due to limited wireless channel resources, our system becomes more scalable
as more normal messages can be relayed, which is achieved by detecting and controlling
spam within a shorter distance.
The maximum propagation distance without relay control is 5.5 km as defined in our
experiment. The relay control reduces the distance of spam by nearly half, as can be clearly






































rc + role + exp
100% detection
Figure 4.7: Average Propagation Distance of Spam
2 kilometers away from origin, due to the fact that authority roles have assisted its cluster
relayer to drop the spam at an earlier phase of propagation. From the curves of rc+exp
and rc+role+exp, we can conclude that the experience-based trust plays a greater part in
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spam control as our experiment simulates for a longer time. This also explains why rc+role
achieves better performance at the beginning but is sooner overwhelmed by rc+exp after
30 minutes. Besides, both curves demonstrate the trend of converging to the curve of 100%
detection, under which scenario the spam is always dropped and never relayed to neighbor
clusters, in other words, restricted within 0.5 kilometers – the length of cluster defined in
our experiment.
The explanation to the trend of convergence lies in two aspects. First, peers acquire
a better understanding of spammers, whose experience-based trust is gradually decreased
to the extent that their messages are not trusted and not relayed. Second, the relay
control model works more effectively in filtering spam as the weight of strong detectors’
trust opinion is relatively promoted, as peers with weak detection power are falling less
trustworthy as system evolves.
4.3.2 Average Number of Received Messages per Peer
Another evaluation metric is the average number of messages received for each peer. Two
sets of experiments are conducted, as shown in the following.
In the first experiment, scalability is studied among six scenarios as the percentage of
spam is adjusted from 0% to 100%. We track a total number of 14400 messages during a
simulation for 2 hours. Experiment results are displayed in Figure 4.8.
Similar to the explanation to the evaluation of the average propagation distance of spam,
the average number of received messages decreases as the percentage of spam increases,
due to the relay control model. We notice that the rc+exp curve outperforms the rc+role
curve when the percentage of spam is greater than 23%. This is because peers learn better











































rc + role + exp
100% detection
Figure 4.8: Average Number of Received Messages per Peer
In the second experiment, we evaluate the accumulative number of received spams per
peer as system evolves. Simulation is conducted for a short duration of 50 minutes, as well
as for a long duration of 230 minutes, as shown in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10.
From the simulation of a short time, we can see that the rc+exp curve is higher than
the rc+role curve until approximately 33 minutes later. The explanation to this is that the
experience-based trust plays a greater part than role-based trust when enough experience
is obtained. After simulating for a longer time, the rc+exp curve and rc+role+exp curve
grow almost as slowly as the 100% detection curve, which indicates that attackers are well
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100% detection

































rc + role + exp
100% detection
Figure 4.10: Average Number of Spams Received per Peer (Long Time)
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4.3.3 Global Relay Effectiveness
We further evaluate system scalability using the third metric “global relay effectiveness”,
which measures how effectively that normal messages are relayed in the global presence of







where N is the total number of clusters, and Ri is the relay effectiveness for a single cluster
Ci, which is computed as
Ri = (1−
number of relayed spams by Ci
number of relayed messages by Ci
)× 100% (4.7)
The attackers here take a different strategy. Instead of sending spam every 5 seconds,
the spammers jam the network in a random frequency but achieve the ultimate goal that
the overall number of sent spams is approximately twice as that of messages by other peers.
We illustrate the global relay effectiveness in Figure 4.11. Attack is suspended until 5
minutes later. Since then, as shown in the original case, the effectiveness drops to around
42% after 120 minutes, and would finally converge to the expected value 33.3% as system
evolves for an infinitely long time. Spams are restricted from dissemination after we apply
the relay control model. Role-based trust always improves the effectiveness in that spams
are further restricted. The global relay effectiveness stops ceasing and begins to recover
after 35 minutes if the experience-based trust is applied, as can be observed from curve
rc+role+exp and rc+exp. As peers become more experienced, the capability of the system
to cope with spammers is strengthened.
4.4 Analysis of Trust Opinion Aggregation
We compare the security level, space efficiency, and time efficiency, among a multiple of ex-
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Figure 4.11: Global Relay Effectiveness
based (Onion), hybrid-signature-based (Hybrid), and our identity-based aggregation (ID-
based) in the following. The details of the first three methods are illustrated in Chapter
5.2.1.
4.4.1 Security Level
The security level of concatenate signature and identity-based signature is high because
neither signatures can be forged nor trust opinions can be repudiated without being de-
tected. Onion signature has a low level of security because only two signatures are kept for
verification – in case of two colluding peers, the data can be arbitrary generated or modified
without being detected. The hybrid signature strikes a balance between the concatenation
signature and onion signature by placing multiple pairs of signatures in the message. So
we assign a medium security level to hybrid signatures.
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4.4.2 Space Efficiency
The sender message “event, confidence, location, time” cost 21 bytes, if we assign 8 bytes
to “event”, 1 byte to “confidence”, 8 bytes to “location”, and 4 bytes to “time”. Each
trust opinion is assigned one byte (1 bit for reaction and 7 bit for confidence), and each
vehicle identity in our region uses 3 bytes (224 ≈ 1.6 million vehicles). Given a message
with n− 1 trust opinions, the space cost is 21 + (n− 1) + 3n = 4n+ 20 bytes, plus the cost
of signatures, as shown below.
For non identity-based aggregation methods, if we apply the ECDSA signature scheme
[32], which is adopted by IEEE 1609.2 standard [37], the signature size is 42 bytes. At
the same time, one certificate must be transmitted along with one signature. If we use
the certificate presented in IEEE 1609.2 standard [37], the certificate costs 125 bytes. For
concatenate-signature-based aggregation, each vehicle identity would cost 42 + 125 = 167
bytes for its signature plus certificate, so the size of aggregate message will be 4n + 20 +
167n = 171n+20 bytes, since each identity occupies 167 bytes. Since onion-signature-based
aggregation only keeps two signatures, the size of aggregate message is 4n+ 20 + 167×2 =
4n+354 bytes. As for hybrid-signature-based aggregation, we define a degree k ∈ [1, bn/2c]
to denote how many pairs of signatures are kept in the message. The aggregate size falls
into 4n+ 20 + 167× 2k = 4n+ 334k + 20 bytes.
For identity-based aggregation, if we want to achieve the same security level of ECDSA,
the signature will be 42 bytes (21 bytes for S and another 21 bytes for T ). In order to
maintain the list of ci, i ∈ [1, n] for n identities, 2n bytes are needed. However, since
the value of ci is usually small, less than 2n bytes might be consumed in practice if a
compaction algorithm such as variable-length encoding is deployed. The ultimate size of
aggregate message falls in an interval between 4n+ 62 and 6n+ 62 bytes.
We compare the aggregate size among these aggregation methods in Figure 4.12. The































Figure 4.12: Space Efficiency
the best space efficiency when the number of identities is smaller than 146, although it
is later surpassed by the onion-signature-based aggregation method, which, in practice,
should not be employed due to its inherent disadvantage of low security and high aggrega-
tion delay.
4.4.3 Time Efficiency
Let T 1 denote the average time cost for a peer to verify one single signature and generate
a trust opinion. The concatenate-signature-based and identity-based aggregation takes
2T to generate an aggregate message with n trust opinions from n peers – for the first
T the message is broadcast to each peer who verifies the message, signs and attaches its
1In practice, the verification time Tv < 500 ms with 200 identities, according to Zhang et. al [38]. The
generation time of trust opinions is depending on the assumed analysis module.
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own opinion; for the second T these opinions are sent back to the aggregator who verifies
and combines these opinions with its own trust opinion into the new aggregate message.
For the onion-signature and hybrid-signature-based aggregation, it requires an aggregation
sequence of n peers where messages are verified, attached an opinion and signed from the
head peer to the tail peer, and thus the total cost is nT .
As a summary of this section, the comparison of secure aggregation methods is shown
in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Comparison of Secure Aggregation Methods
Security Level Aggregate Size (in bytes) Aggregation Delay
Conc. high 171n+ 20 2T
Onion low 4n+ 354 nT
Hybrid medium 4n+ 334k + 20 nT
ID-based high 4n+ 62 ∼ 6n+ 62 2T
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we demonstrate the system effectiveness and scalability through an ex-
perimental simulation. We also illustrate the advantage of our identity-based aggregation
method by comparing its space and time efficiency to other existing methods.
Throughout the experiment, we realize that the system effectiveness and scalability are
dependent on two important factors: a) peer’s local knowledge, and b) control of malicious
messages. With a better understanding and stronger control of malicious messages, system
effectiveness is improved as less peers are effected. At the same time, the system becomes
more scalable as malicious messages are more likely to be detected and dropped.
As the peer accumulates more experience and derives local decisions from a more reliable
set of trust opinions, a better local knowledge is acquired. Although the accumulation of
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experience can be time-consuming, the experience-based trust demonstrate a strong effect
on system effectiveness and scalability. The existence of authority and role-based trust
improves the quality of trust opinions from which less wrong actions are derived.
The control of malicious messages is implemented by our relay control model. Although
it only improves system effectiveness slightly due to the dominating effect of trust opinions,
the relay control model greatly improves system scalability as it detects and filters malicious
messages.
As for the aggregation efficiency, our identity-based aggregation method achieves high
space efficiency and time efficiency without degrading the level of security. Compared to
other existing aggregation methods, it is the only applicable method for our trust-based




In this chapter, we survey the work related to our trust-based message evaluation and
propagation framework. We mainly focus on two important perspectives: trust modeling
and data aggregation in mobile/vehicular ad-hoc networks.
5.1 Trust Modeling
The work on trust modeling in mobile/vehicular ad-hoc networks can be categorized as two
subsets: 1) trust establishment, which addresses the issues in how to define and establish
the trust between two mobile entities; 2) trust utilization, which deals with the problems
in how to apply the currently available set of trust to achieve the specific goal, under the
proposed application scenario.
5.1.1 Trust Establishment
The paper [39] is one of the earliest work on trust modeling in mobile ad-hoc networks.
It identifies several important properties of trust establishment, such as the specification
of admissible types of evidence, the generation, distribution and evaluation of trust evi-
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dences in mobile ad-hoc networks, which are different from those of trust establishments
in Internet.
A trust establishment scheme called Hermes is introduced in [40] with the objective of
reliable delivery and routing in mobile ad-hoc networks. The trust between two neighbor-
ing peers is modeled as trustworthiness, which takes confidence into concern and can be
computed using a Bayesian approach based on an empirical set of first-hand observations
of packet forwarding behavior of neighboring peers. Choosing the best route between the
source and destination amounts to determining the shortest path, where the weigh of the
path is computed from a set of peer-to-peer trust between the peers within the path. The
work in [41] extends [40] in that recommendation trust is introduced to model the trust
between two non-neighboring peers. The trust to a remote peer is established by collecting
recommendations from a set of nodes.
Similar to [40, 41], the work in [42] models the trust evaluation as a path optimization
problem on a direct graph where each peer is a vertex and trust between two neighboring
peer is an edge. The author introduces the semiring-based evaluation metric that features
in two binary operators, + and ∗. The former operator is used for trust computation over
a path of peers while the latter one is to compute the optimal aggregated trust among a
set of available paths. Two operators can be reloaded via different semiring algorithms so
as to adapt to various conditions.
Sun et al. [43, 44] present an information theoretic framework to quantitively measure
and model the trust in ad-hoc networks. It first defines three trust axioms: a) concatenation
propagation of trust does not increase trust; b) multi-path propagation of trust does not
reduce trust; c) trust based on multiple observations from a single source should not
be higher than the multiple observations from multiple independent sources. An entropy-
based trust model and a probability-based model are introduced in which the author shows
how to compute trust along a path as well as the overall trust among a set of paths. The
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trust value between two neighboring nodes are based on observations. Third, the paper
discusses how to obtain, evaluate, and update trust when it comes to ad hoc routing. Briefly
speaking, each node maintains its trust record about other nodes. The source node finds
multiple routes to the destination node when the source node wants to establish a route to
the destination node. The source node evaluates the packet-forwarding trustworthiness of
each node on a route, either by its own trust record or by requesting recommendations from
other nodes. After the best trustworthy route is chosen, data is transmitted. After the
transmission, the source node updates the trust records based on its observation of route
quality. Compared to their work, our system model requires that each peer maintains a
list of other peers and derives their trust from messaging and posterior-experience.
The proposed methodologies in [40, 41, 42, 43, 44] may not work effectively in vehicular
networks because in practice the trust cannot be established, maintained or retrieved unless
a reliable route is available, which is hard to establish in a highly dynamic environment
such as vehicular networks. Previous trust modeling endeavors in ad-hoc networks, such
as improving routing quality, and deriving reliability between arbitrary peers, may become
effortless when it comes to vehicular networks, due to its two basic inherent properties.
First, peer connection is ephemeral as vehicle entities are moving fast with little time
for interaction. Second, interaction between two entities is highly infrequent due to peer’s
mobile nature and broad real world environment. As a result, trust establishment is difficult
and even if trust can be established between two vehicle entities, it may be out-of-date and
uncertain.
Considering the uncertainty property of trust establishment in mobile ad-hoc networks,
Balakrishnan et al. [45] expresses the notion of ignorance during the establishment of
trust relationships between mobile nodes. Subjective logic based model is employed to
denote the trust as a three dimensional metric: belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. The
uncertainty represents the ignorance between two nodes. Such representation is useful since
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an existing peer may not have a record of past evidence towards a newcomer/stranger peer,
in which case assigning an arbitrary trust value could bring about problems. Compared to
their work, our trust model proposes a different methodology which takes two factors into
deployment, namely, a set of fixed roles and the aging factor in experience-based trust.
Roles decrease the uncertainty in that their trust are fixed. Aging factor ages the trust
between two entities until new interactions are available.
5.1.2 Trust Utilization
The work in [40, 41, 42, 43, 44] targets the goal of reliable packet delivery from the perspec-
tive of source routing in mobile ad-hoc networks. In vehicular networks, similar attempts
to apply trust to routing may face challenges in that most of proposed source routing al-
gorithms in mobile ad-hoc networks may not work well in vehicular networks, plus the fact
that trust establishment is more challenging in the vehicular environment.
The work in [46] employs trust into the data evaluation in vehicular networks. In con-
trast to traditional views of entity-level trust, it proposes data-centric trust establishment
that deals with the evaluation of trustworthiness of messages from other peers instead
of vehicle entities themselves. A set of trust metrics are defined to represent the data
trust from multiple dimensions, such as vehicle’s security status, peer type and event type.
Based on Bayesian interference and Dempster-Shafer Theory, they evaluate the decision
logic which outputs the trust values of various data regarding a particular event. Although
it shares some commonalities with ours, such as the employment of data trust over peer
trust, their work has two shortcomings that fundamentally impedes their model from being
applied in reality. First, trust relationship in entities can never be reliably established and
only ephemeral trust in data is built, and thus the data-centric trust has to be established
again and again for each event, which may not be applicable to situations under the sparse
environment where few interactions/data are available. Second, there lacks a bridge that
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effectively connects the data trust and peer trust together, in that the peer trust is as-
sumed to be always available in their decision logic and peers are not responsible for their
misbehavior, neglecting the dynamics such as dishonest and malicious attackers.
Golle et al. [19] propose an approach to detect and correct malicious data in vehicular
networks. They assume that each vehicular peer is maintaining a model which consists of
all the knowledge that the peer has about the network. Data is trusted if it agrees with the
model with a high probability. Otherwise, a heuristic is invoked to restore data consistency
by nding the simplest explanation possible. Multiple explanations are ranked and the peers
accept the data if it is consistent with the most highly ranked one(s). However, they assume
that each vehicle has the global knowledge of the network and solely evaluates the validity
of data, which may not be feasible in practice. Our work also provides high resistance
and security against malicious entities using a fundamentally different way of message
evaluation. Instead of relying on an assumed model and seeking explanations, messages in
our model are evaluated in a distributed and collaborative fashion by collecting multiple
opinions during their propagation.
Minhas et al. [20] demonstrate an expanded trust management model for agents in
vehicular networks, which features in the role-based trust and experience-based trust as
the evaluation metric of vehicular entities, as well as the majority consensus model, which is
computed from peer trust and used as an evaluation metric for data trustworthiness. Based
on the work of Minhas et al., we extend their trust management model in three aspects.
First, we have designed a trust propagation scheme that effectively establishes the trust
relationship between vehicular agents through message dissemination and trust opinion
aggregation so that trust can be more widely established among more agents. Second, we
work on the details of the aggregation algorithm that ensures a secure and efficient trust
opinion aggregation. Third, we have proposed an action model that aids vehicle agents to
evaluate the trustworthiness of each message instead of relying on the majority consensus
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model, which is adapted and used in our relay control model.
5.2 Data Aggregation
Some recent work on comfort or safety applications in vehicular networks is largely depen-
dent on data dissemination and aggregation. While discussing them all in detail would
exceed the scope of our work, we first focus on several major applications that use aggre-
gation techniques to achieve a specific goal. After that, we point out the stringent security
necessity and list several recent solutions on secure data aggregation in vehicular networks,
each with pros and cons.
Self-Organizing Traffic-Information System (SOTIS) [47, 48] assumes each vehicle is
equipped with a map based on which the road is partitioned into multiple segments. Each
vehicle broadcasts data about the traffic information of the road segments within its trans-
mission range. The broadcast data are collected and aggregated into one average value,
together with a time stamp indicating the freshness. The system believes an aggregate is
better if it has a newer time stamp, but the time stamp is generated upon aggregation
instead of observation of an event. Due to the way the aggregated value is computed, the
system can only handle numerical values so that not all types of data can be aggregated.
And also, aggregate may not best reflect the road situation for that all messages are equally
treated.
Similar to [47, 48], a TrafficView system is modeled in [10] where the traffic view
is recovered by vehicles distributing their speed and position information. Aggregation
is improved in three aspects: 1) observations are weighted by the distance between the
aggregator and the sender and the oldest time stamp among all observations is chosen
as the time stamp for the aggregate; 2) a cost-based or ratio-based algorithm is applied
to selectly aggregate a subset of messages and discard the rest, given a limited size of
the final aggregate; 3) information aging is taken into consideration while updating the
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record. However, such aggregation cannot apply to complex city road scenarios because
the distance is a one dimensional metric and thus cannot recover the whole planar traffic
view.
A hierarchical aggregation scheme of traffic information is introduced in [49]. Instead
of carrying specific values, the aggregate features in the Flajolet-Martin sketch used as
a probabilistic approximation. The employment of Flajolet-Martin sketches brings in the
advantage that aggregates are duplicate insensitive, allowing multiple aggregates with their
values combined and merged into one aggregate without increasing the aggregate size. At
the same time, such probabilistic aggregation has two drawbacks. First, aggregate cannot
accurately present a value, especially when it is small. Second, when multiple observations
are compacted and merged into one value, the quantitative information such as the number
of observations is discarded, ignoring the fact that an aggregate of more observations is
usually more reliable than an aggregate of less ones.
Lochert et al. [50] proposes a similar aggregation scheme where the travel time for a road
segment is hierarchically aggregated to estimate the overall time between two landmarks.
Their design relies on an infrastructure and thus suffers from its availability and scalability
and cannot be used here.
5.2.1 Secure Aggregation
The above mentioned aggregation methodologies mainly target at basic requirements in a
particular application scenario, assuming that the network is under a reliable, fully-trusted,
and peer-friendly environment. Security related issues were not taken into consideration,
which renders the network vulnerable when confronted by a malicious party. A secure
aggregation mechanism requires that data are aggregated without being modified. Any
maliciousness can be detected and prevented from hampering the system at an early stage.
Before secure aggregation was first studied for vehicular networks, several work at-
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tempted to satisfy the security demands of aggregation in sensor networks. The work [51]
assumes a static binary-tree alike network topology for data aggregation. Data authenti-
cation is based on a pre-shared temporary key which may be compromised and delayed in
its design. Przydatek et al. [52] provides an aggregate-commit-prove approach where the
aggregator computes the collected data and then commits the aggregation results to the
home server. The server later verifies the results by performing an interactive proof with
the aggregator. Yang et al. [53] presents a hop-by-hop aggregation method based on the
principles of divide-and-conquer, which partitions the whole network into subgroups in a
recursive and hierarchical fashion, and commit-and-test, which recursively aggregates data
from subgroups and identifies suspicious groups based on multiple group aggregates.
We realize that these aggregation protocols for sensor networks may not be suitable
for vehicular networks because those protocols may only work under the assumption of a
static network topology and reliable multiple peer-to-peer interactions, both of which are
not available in vehicular networks due to great peer dynamics and lack of a prevalent
infrastructure.
Instead, current approaches in vehicular networks usually require a digital signature on
each message being aggregated so that neither a message can be maliciously repudiated
nor could an attacker disseminate bogus information without being traced.
Raya et al. [29] illustrate a secure aggregation scheme which aggregates messages and
signatures from different parties signing the message. The model features in three types of
aggregate signature schemes, as shown in Figure 5.1.
1. Concatenate Signature: the vehicle signs a message m and rebroadcasts the new mes-
sage to the aggregator, who collects all signed messages from all signers. Signatures
Si(m) are concatenated and appended to m so that all signatures are independent
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Figure 5.1: Concatenated, Onion, and Hybrid Signature
ture verifications and also, the size of an aggregate grows linearly with the number
of signatures and certificates, which are space costly.
2. Onion Signature: an onion signature borrows the idea of onion routing. A message
is over-signed during its propagation, i.e, a signer signs the signed message from its
predecessor and forwards the new message to its successor. The n-th node verifies the
signature Sn−1 before over-signing Sn−1. Such protects data validity and requires at
most two signatures, reduces the communication overhead by concatenate signatures,
and yet increases the computation overhead because of the inherent property of
onion routing. At the same time, it opens the vulnerability window by allowing two
colluding attackers to modify messages without being detected.
3. Hybrid Signature: although onion signature reduces the communication cost of con-
catenate signature, it goes insecure when nodes collude. A hybrid signature strikes a
balance between the two by concatenating several onion signatures, each at a given
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depth, which strengthens the security of signatures by hardening the collusion. How-
ever, there still exists a possibility that signatures can be compromised.
And also, onion signature and hybrid signature are based on a strong assumption that
signature aggregation is done in a sequential order, i.e., the n-th signer must aggregate its
own signature into the aggregate signature formed by its previous n−1 signers. An ordered
signing sequence would reflect a chained trust relationship among peers, which may not be
available or appreciated in vehicular networks. In practice, a chained aggregation may be
not acceptable due to its availability and aggregation delay; we would prefer a non-chained
aggregation strategy, as shown in Figure 5.2. We proposed an aggregation scheme that is
non-chained and extends current identity-based aggregate signature algorithm [31], as is
discussed in the following context.
Moreover, all these aggregate signatures make use of asymmetric cryptography and
rely on public key infrastructure (PKI). In other words, signature verification requires
additional information – the signer’s public keys and certificates (e.g. Certi in Figure
5.1). Such information, that is usually in big size compared to the message itself, needs
to be carried along with the signature because it is not preferable to assume that any
verifier would have already kept all public keys and certificates in its local repository. As a
result, aggregation achieves high security with a trade-off of great space overhead, rending
it inefficient and reversely degrading system performance.
An identity-based aggregate signature scheme [31] comes into existence in recent years
and overwhelms the above signature schemes in three aspects. First, multiple signatures
are compacted into one single signature while the message can be still verified. Second,
instead of storing/carring public keys and certificates, the verifier only needs to obtain a
list of identities of signers, which are much smaller than public keys and certificates. Third,
no matter how messages are aggregated, the scheme does not imply a trust chain among
peers and thus the final aggregate signature remains unique. With overall information
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Figure 5.2: Chained Aggregation and Non-chained Aggregation. M is a message, A,B,C
are peers who signs M . In a chained aggregation scheme, M is signed sequentially by A,
B and C into MABC ; in a non-chained aggregation scheme, M is signed by each peer i into
Mi, and then all Mi are aggregated by any third party into MABC .
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required for verification minimized, it achieves high efficiency without compromising the
security constraint. However, such a scheme requires n different signatures from n distinct
signers. In other words, when it comes to merging two duplicate signed messages from the
same signer, which is often true under a certain aggregation strategy, aggregation would
fail because the aggregated signature cannot pass verification.
Based on [31], Zhu [54] introduces an aggregated emergency message authentication
scheme for vehicular networks, where a vehicle randomly generates a pseudonym as its
identity each time a new emergency message is signed. Signed messages can be aggregated
and verified even if there are duplicate ones. However, their work cannot be applied
into our system because there is no way to trace the signer given the signed message.
This leaves ample space for an attacker who signs arbitrary fake messages under different
pseudo-identities so as to forge the fact that multiple peers have participated in signing a
message.
A batch message verification method [38] is proposed, where multiple signatures on
different messages are compacted into one signature, so that the road side unit (RSU) can
verify a bunch of messages in one pass. The identity of the signer can be traced by the
central authority (CA) but the system relies on the temper-proof device which might be
either hacked or working improperly.
In summary, we need an aggregation scheme that achieves efficiency without compro-
mising security. An extended identity-based aggregation scheme is presented in our work,
which resolves the stringent needs for security, efficiency, scalability and flexibility.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
We present in this thesis a novel message evaluation and propagation framework in vehic-
ular networks, where a set of trust metrics, such as trust opinion, experience-based trust
and role-based trust, are used to model the data quality and the relationship between
peers. Our proposed message evaluation approach is conducted in a distributed, collabo-
rative fashion during the message propagation, and effectively increases the overall data
reliability and system effectiveness by proactively detecting malicious data. Our message
propagation method features in a trust-based relay control model that filters malicious
data and promotes network scalability. Moreover, we illustrate an identity-based data ag-
gregation scheme that collects and aggregates trust opinions in a secure and efficient way.
Experimental and analytical results demonstrate that our approach works effectively and
efficiently for the domain of vehicular networks.
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6.2 Future Work
As shown in Chapter 2, our framework depends on the existence of trust opinions, which
are generated by the assumed analysis module. The design of such a module would involve
much consideration from the perspective of hardware design, such as the design of temper-
proof devices, car sensors and human-computer interactive interfaces.
Our trust aggregation and message propagation model is based on the cluster-based
routing scheme, which has not resolved all possible issues yet. Considering that cluster-
based routing has addressed little concern to security, we might further consider the pres-
ence of malicious relayers who intentionally drop messages, and design a set of detection
and revocation mechanisms, to see how our system copes with possible attacks.
Due to the practical concerns of trust opinion aggregation, e.g. it is very likely that only
a subset of trust opinions are available for aggregation due to complex road settings, we
may evaluate the system effectiveness when partial trust opinions are available. Moreover,
since we mentioned in Chapter 4.4.2 that a variable-length encoding algorithm could further
compact the size of an aggregated message, we will develop such an algorithm and evaluate
the improvement in space efficiency.
As for the experimental evaluation, more complex scenarios may be employed in our
simulation. For example, considering that our current metric for evaluating system effec-
tiveness is the average number of wrong actions by each peer, we may examine the global
awareness and resistance to a pre-defined set of fake events/data. The vehicle density is an
important aspect whose effect on our trust model may be studied as well. Besides, more
sophisticated attack models, such as peer collusion, will be evaluated in the future.
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